

Bonus or Not?

Learn to Reward in Crowdsourcing

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Monetary Rewards in Crowdsourcing

Monetary rewards are widely used in crowdsourcing.



(Performance-contingent) Monetary rewards can affect work quality! [Harris 2011; Yin *et al.* 2013; Ho *et al.* 2015]

How to “Wisely” Use Bonus?


Whether and when to provide performance-contingent bonuses for a worker working on a sequence of tasks?

Common practice: Fixed or random policy

How do workers react to bonuses provided in selected tasks in a sequence?



What is the trade-off between improved quality and increased costs?



Our Approach

How do workers react to bonuses provided in selected tasks in a sequence?

What is the trade-off between improved quality and increased costs?

**Input-output
hidden Markov model**



Requester utility function

Whether and when to provide performance-contingent bonuses for a worker working on a sequence of tasks?


Online decision making

Requester's utility improves 27% compared to following the common practice policy!

Characterize the Bonus Impact with IOHMM

Transition probability: $P_{tr}(z_t | z_{t-1}, a_t)$

a_t : whether bonus is provided in task t











z_t : worker's hidden state in task t (out of K possibilities)

Emission probability: $P_e(x_t | z_t, a_t)$

x_t : whether the answer in task t has high-quality

Learn the IOHMM

Training Dataset

				...	
	✓	✓	✗	...	✓
				...	
	✗	✗	✓	...	✓
				...	
	✓	✗	✓	...	✗

Expectation-
Maximization

Learned IOHMM

Transition Probability
Matrices (T^a)


Emission Probability
Matrices (E^a)

Initial State Belief (b_0)

The Online Decision Making Problem

Requesters are assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function:

$$U = w_l N_{LQ} + w_h N_{HQ} - c N_{bonus}$$



Whether to place bonus on his **next** task to maximize requester's overall utility in the T -task session?

Decision Making with the Learned IOHMM

$EU_{\max}(\mathbf{b}, a, l)$: The maximum expected utility a requester can obtain for the next l tasks, when the current state belief is \mathbf{b} , the input for the next task is a .

$$EU_{\max}(\mathbf{b}, a, l) = \begin{cases} l = 1: & R(\mathbf{b}, a) \\ l > 1: & R(\mathbf{b}, a) + \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}} \left(\sum_{i=1}^K b(i) \sum_{j=1}^K P_{tr}(j|i, a) P_e(x|j, a) \right) V(b'_{a,x}, l-1) \end{cases}$$

$$a_{t_c+1} = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \{0,1\}} EU_{\max}(\mathbf{b}(t_c), a, T - t_c)$$

Heuristic Algorithms

This problem is equivalent to solve a finite-horizon POMDP, which is computationally hard.

- ❑ **n -step look-ahead:** Consider to maximize requester utility in (at most) the next n tasks.
- ❑ **MLS-MDP:** Estimate the most likely sequence (MLS) and follow the optimal MDP policy for the current state.
- ❑ **Q-MDP:** Calculate Q-function values of the MDP; choose the input level that maximize the expected Q-function values given the current belief.

MTurk Experiment Task: Word Puzzle

O	V	H	L	E	G	T	Y	J	E	Z	J
P	V	L	M	Q	A	K	L	M	L	P	Q
M	A	A	Y	W	M	T	A	K	U	G	M
P	G	E	Q	G	E	G	M	X	U	A	Q
Y	A	K	B	C	W	H	R	S	S	M	K
Q	M	K	G	A	M	E	A	N	K	E	I
A	E	G	D	E	M	K	L	L	M	J	Y
E	M	G	M	A	N	B	E	A	X	F	P
M	X	A	G	Z	K	I	G	G	A	M	E
W	G	D	B	D	S	Y	P	Z	A	E	X
Z	P	W	Y	W	J	E	H	T	M	M	M
R	K	I	K	M	I	O	V	N	L	V	E

O	V	H	L	E	G	T	Y	J	E	Z	J
P	V	L	M	Q	A	K	L	M	L	P	Q
M	A	A	Y	W	M	T	A	K	U	G	M
P	G	E	Q	G	E	G	M	X	U	A	Q
Y	A	K	B	C	W	H	R	S	S	M	K
Q	M	K	G	A	M	E	A	N	K	E	I
A	E	G	D	E	M	K	L	L	M	J	Y
E	M	G	M	A	N	B	E	A	X	F	P
M	X	A	G	Z	K	I	G	G	A	M	E
W	G	D	B	D	S	Y	P	Z	A	E	X
Z	P	W	Y	W	J	E	H	T	M	M	M
R	K	I	K	M	I	O	V	N	L	V	E

Find the appearance of the target
word as many times as possible

Collect the Training Dataset

- ❑ **50** workers: each completes a HIT of $T = 9$ word puzzle tasks.
- ❑ **20%** of the tasks are randomly selected as bonus tasks.
- ❑ A worker can earn a **5**-cent bonus in a bonus task if she finds out more than **80%** of all appearances of the target word (i.e. the answer is of high-quality).

A Peek into the Learned IOHMM

$K = 2$ hidden states in the Learned IOHMM.

Initial state belief: $b_0 = (0.67, 0.33)$

Emission probability matrices:

$$\text{No Bonus} \quad E^0 \overset{\text{LQ} \quad \text{HQ}}{\underset{\text{S1} \quad \text{S2}}{=}} \begin{pmatrix} 0.10 & 0.90 \\ 0.88 & 0.12 \end{pmatrix}, \quad E^1 \overset{\text{LQ} \quad \text{HQ}}{\underset{\text{S1} \quad \text{S2}}{=}} \begin{pmatrix} 0.13 & 0.87 \\ 0.61 & 0.39 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{Bonus}$$

- State 1: “Diligent”
- State 2: “Lazy”, but can be improved with bonus


Transition probability matrices:

$$\text{No Bonus} \quad T^0 \overset{\text{S1} \quad \text{S2}}{\underset{\text{S1} \quad \text{S2}}{=}} \begin{pmatrix} 0.92 & 0.08 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad T^1 \overset{\text{S1} \quad \text{S2}}{\underset{\text{S1} \quad \text{S2}}{=}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0.09 & 0.91 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{Bonus}$$

- No Bonus: a small chance to “slack off” from the diligent state
- Bonus: a small chance to “promote” to the diligent state

The Effectiveness of Dynamic Control


- ❑ 6 treatments, 50 random workers per treatment
- ❑ $w_l = 0$, $w_h = 0.15$, $c = 0.05$



An increase in requester utility beyond the best baseline as much as **27.22%** !

The Effectiveness of Dynamic Control

- ❑ 6 treatments, 50 random workers per treatment
- ❑ $w_l = 0$, $w_h = 0.15$, $c = 0.05$



# HQ answers	300	331	349	322	395	368
Cost (\$)	0	8.60	17.45	1.90	2.00	4.40

More high-quality answers, **lower** costs!

Dynamic Control Example



✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓



	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Strategically focus on incentivizing “lazy” workers!

Dynamic Control Example



	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS	BONUS			
X	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓



				BONUS	BONUS	BONUS		
✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	X

Provide bonus at the right timing!

How Robust is Our Approach?

❑ Different worker behavior models

- Model 1: Worker's accuracy changes from acc^l to acc^h when bonus is provided
- Model 2: Work quality is decided by comparing the actual payment with the reference of “appropriate payment level”

❑ Different worker characteristics

- Skill level (α_i); Sensitivity to monetary rewards (β_i)

❑ Different composition of worker population

- P_α, P_β

Follow a dynamic control policy always **match or improve** requester utility compared to the best baseline!

Summary

- ❑ We propose to use IOHMM to learn the impact of bonuses on work quality and use this model to dynamically control the placement of bonus.
- ❑ Both MTurk experiment and simulation show that our approach can robustly lead to improved requester utility.
- ❑ **Shows the promise of algorithmically controlling incentives in crowdsourcing!**



Thank you!